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ENCRYPTION SCHEME BASED ON EXPANDED REED-SOLOMON
CODES
KARAN KHATHURIA, JOACHIM ROSENTHAL, AND VIOLETTA WEGER
Abstract. We present a code-based public-key cryptosystem, in which we use Reed-Solomon
codes over an extension field as secret codes and disguise it by considering its shortened
expanded code over the base field. Considering shortened expanded codes provides a safeguard
against distinguisher attacks based on the Schur product. Moreover, without using a cyclic or
a quasi-cyclic structure we obtain a key size reduction of nearly 45% compared to the classic
McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Bernstein et al.
1. Introduction
In 1978McEliece [31] presented the first code-based public key cryptosystem. It belongs to the
family of very few public-key cryptosystems which are unbroken since decades. The hard problem
the McEliece system relies on, is the difficulty of decoding a random (-like) linear code having no
visible structure. McEliece proposed to use binary Goppa codes for the encryption scheme. Due
to the low error-correcting capacity of Goppa codes, the cryptosystem results in large public
key sizes. Several alternative families of codes have been proposed with the aim of reducing the
key sizes. Some of the famous families of codes considered are: generalized Reed-Solomon codes
[5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 25, 36], non-binary Goppa codes [12], algebraic geometric codes [24], LDPC and
MDPC codes [7, 34], Reed-Muller codes [41] and convolutional codes [29]. Most of them were
unsuccessful in hiding the structure of the private code [15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 33, 37, 42, 46].
The motivation to quest for better code-based cryptosystems is mainly due to the advent of
quantum computers. In 1994 Peter Shor [40] developed a polynomial time quantum algorithm
for factoring integers and solving discrete logarithm problems. This means that most of the
currently popular cryptosystems, such as RSA and ECC, will be broken in an era of quantum
computers. In the ongoing process of the standardization of quantum-resistant public-key cryp-
tographic algorithms by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), code-based
cryptosystems are one of the most promising candidates. At the time of this writing there are
seven code-based cryptosystems included in NIST’s standardization process: BIKE [3] based
on quasi-cyclic MDPC codes, classic McEliece [11] based on binary Goppa codes, ROLLO [32]
based on quasi-cyclic LRPC codes, RQC [1] based on rank metric quasi-cyclic codes, HQC [1]
based on Hamming metric quasi-cyclic codes, LEDAcrypt [4] based on quasi-cyclic LDPC codes
and NTS-KEM [2] based on binary Goppa codes.
In this paper we present a new variant of the McEliece scheme using expanded Reed-Solomon
codes. A linear [n, k] code defined over an extension field Fqm can be expanded, over the base
field Fq, to a [mn,mk] linear code by expanding each codeword with respect to a fixed Fq-
linear isomorphism from Fqm to F
m
q . In the proposed cryptosystem we hide the structure of
an expanded GRS code by puncturing and permuting the columns of its parity check matrix
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and multiplying by an invertible block diagonal matrix. In order to decode a large number
of non-codewords, we use a burst of errors during the encryption step, i.e. we consider error
vectors having support in sub-vectors of size λ. This error pattern comes with a disadvantage:
it can be used to speed up the information set decoding (ISD) algorithms. However, for a small
degree of extension m, the key sizes turn out to be remarkably competitive.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the preliminaries regarding the
expanded codes. In Section 3, we describe the proposed cryptosystem which is based on the
shortening of an expanded generalized Reed-Solomon code. In Section 4, we provide security
arguments for the proposed cryptosystem against the known structural and non-structural at-
tacks. In Section 5, we provide parameters of the proposed cryptosystem that achieve a security
level of 256-bits against the ISD algorithm.
2. Background
2.1. Expanded Codes. Let q be a prime power and let m be an integer. Let γ be a primitive
element of the field Fqm , i.e. Fqm ∼= Fq(γ). The field Fqm can also be seen as an Fq- vector space
of dimension m via the following Fq-linear isomorphism
φ : Fqm −→ F
m
q ,
a0 + a1γ + · · ·+ am−1γ
m−1 7−→ (a0, a1, . . . , am−1).
We extend this isomorphism for vectors over Fqm in the following way:
φn : F
n
qm −→ F
mn
q ,
(α0, α1, . . . , αn−1) 7−→ (φ(α0), φ(α1), . . . , φ(αn−1)) .
This is clearly an Fq-linear isomorphism. Hence this gives us a way to obtain a linear code over
Fq from a linear code over Fqm .
Definition 2.1 (Expanded Codes). Let n, k be positive integers with k ≤ n, let q be a prime
power and m be an integer. Let C be a linear code of length n and dimension k over Fqm . The
expanded code of C with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ Fqm is a linear code over the base
field Fq defined as
Ĉ := {φn(c) : c ∈ C},
where φn is the Fq-linear isomorphism defined by γ as above.
Remark 1. It is easy to see that the expanded code Ĉ is a linear code of length mn and
dimension mk, because φn is an Fq-linear isomorphism and
|Ĉ| = |C| = (qm)k = qmk.
Given a code C with its generator matrix and parity check matrix, the following lemma gives
a way to construct a generator matrix and a parity check matrix of the expanded code Ĉ.
Lemma 2.2. Let C be a linear code in Fnqm .
(1) Let C have a generator matrix G = [g1, g2, . . . , gk]
⊺, where g1, g2, . . . , gk are vectors in
F
n
qm . Then the expanded code of C over Fq with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ Fqm
has the expanded generator matrix
Ĝ := [φn(g1), φn(γg1), . . . , φn(γ
m−1g1),φn(g2), φn(γg2), . . . , φn(γ
m−1g2), . . . ,
φn(gk), φn(γgk) . . . , φn(γ
m−1gk)]
⊺.
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(2) Let C have a parity check matrix H = [h⊺1 , h
⊺
2 , . . . , h
⊺
n], where h1, h2, . . . , hn are vectors in
F
n−k
qm . Then the expanded code of C over Fq with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ Fqm
has the expanded parity check matrix
Ĥ := [φn−k(h1)
⊺, φn−k(γh1)
⊺, . . . , φn−k(γ
m−1h1)
⊺, φn−k(h2)
⊺, φn−k(γh2)
⊺,
. . . , φn−k(γ
m−1h2)
⊺, . . . , φn−k(hn)
⊺, φn−k(γhn)
⊺ . . . , φn−k(γ
m−1hn)
⊺].
Proof. See [47, Theorem 1]. 
Proposition 1. Let C be a linear code in Fnqm having a generator matrix G = [g1, g2, . . . , gk]
⊺
and a parity check matrix H = [h⊺1 , h
⊺
2 , . . . , h
⊺
n]. Let Ĝ and Ĥ be the expanded generator matrix
and expanded parity check matrix of Ĉ, respectively. Then
(1) φn(xG) = φk(x)Ĝ for all x ∈ F
k
qm ,
(2) φn−k(Hy
⊺) = Ĥ(φn(y))
⊺ for all y ∈ Fnqm .
Proof. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∈ F
k
qm and let xi =
∑m−1
j=0 xijγ
j for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Then
φk(x)Ĝ =
k∑
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
xijφn(γ
jgi)
=
k∑
i=1
φn
m−1∑
j=0
xijγ
jgi

=
k∑
i=1
φn(xigi)
= φn
(
k∑
i=1
xigi
)
= φn(xG).
Similarly, φn−k(Hy
⊺) = Ĥ(φn(y))
⊺ for all y ∈ Fnqm . 
Remark 2. Ĉ can also be determined by the commutativity of the following diagram (as Fq-
linear maps):
0 Fkqm F
n
qm F
n−k
qm 0
0 Fmkq F
mn
q F
m(n−k)
q 0
G
φk φn
H⊺
φn−k
Ĝ Ĥ⊺
3. The Cryptosystem
In this section we will present the proposed cryptosystem in the Niederreiter version. We
consider an expanded GRS code whose parity check matrix can be viewed as n blocks, where
each block is of size m. In order to destroy the algebraic structure of the code, we choose
2 ≤ λ ≤ m− 1 and shorten it on randomly chosen m− λ columns in each block. We then hide
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the shortened code by multiplying it with an invertible matrix, which preserves the weight of a
vector over the extension field Fqm .
Key generation: Let q be a prime power, 2 ≤ λ < m be positive integers and k < n ≤ qm be
positive integers, satisfying R := k/n > (1 − λ/m). Consider a GRS code C = GRSn,k(α, β) of
dimension k and length n over the finite field Fqm and choose a parity check matrix H of C. Let
t be the error correction capacity of C.
Let Ĥ be the expanded parity check matrix of the expanded code Ĉ of C with respect to a
primitive element γ ∈ Fqm . Ĥ is an m(n− k)×mn matrix over Fq.
Shortening Ĉ.
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Si be a randomly chosen subset of
{(i− 1)m+ 1, (i− 1)m+ 2, . . . , im} of size m− λ and define S =
n⋃
i=1
Si.
• We puncture Ĥ on columns indexed by S. Let ĤS be the resulting
m(n− k)× λn parity check matrix and let ĈS be the shortened code.
Hiding ĈS.
• Choose n random λ × λ invertible matrices T1, T2, . . . , Tn over Fq. Define T to be the
block diagonal matrix having T1, T2, . . . , Tn as diagonal blocks.
• Now choose a random permutation σ of length n and define Pσ to be the block permu-
tation matrix of size λn × λn. It can also be seen as Kronecker product of the n × n
permutation matrix corresponding to σ and the identity matrix of size λ.
• Define Q := TPσ and compute H
′ = ĤSQ.
The private key is then (H,Q, γ) and the public key is (H ′, t, λ).
Encryption: Let y ∈ Fλnq be a message having support in t sub-vectors each of length λ, in
particular
support(y) ⊆ {λ(i1 − 1) + 1, λ(i1 − 1) + 2, . . . , λ(i1), λ(i2 − 1) + 1, λ(i2 − 1) + 2,
. . . , λ(i2), . . . , λ(it − 1) + 1, λ(it − 1) + 2, . . . , λ(it)} ,
for some distinct i1, i2, . . . , it ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then compute the cipher text
c = H ′y⊺.
Decryption: For the decryption we apply φ−1n−k on c, i.e.
φ−1n−k(c) = φ
−1
n−k
(
ĤSQy
⊺
)
.
Observe that ĤSQy
⊺ = Ĥy¯⊺, where y¯ is the embedding of yQ⊺ to Fqm , by introducing zeros on
the positions indexed by S. From Proposition 1 we get
φ−1n−k
(
Ĥy¯⊺
)
= H
(
φ−1n (y¯)
)⊺
.
Due to the block structure of the matrixQ, the vector of Qy⊺ has support in t sub-vectors each
of length λ, thus y¯ has support in t sub-vectors each of length m. Henceforth wt(φ−1n (y¯)) ≤ t,
and we can decode φ−1n−k(c) to get φ
−1
n (y¯). By applying φn we get y¯ and by projecting on
positions not indexed by S, we get Qy⊺ and therefore after multiplying by Q−1, we recover the
message y.
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Choice of parameters. For low key sizes it is desirable to use a small degree of extension m
and small λ.
In the case of quadratic extension and in the case of λ = 1, puncturing all but one column
from each block results in an alternant code (subfield subcode of a GRS code). Alternant codes
are known to be vulnerable to square code attacks [17, 19]. Hence, we do not propose to use
quadratic extensions or λ = 1.
We therefore propose to use m = 3 and m = 4 with λ = 2.
4. Security
In this section we discuss the security of the proposed cryptosystem. We focus on the three
main attacks on cryptosystems based on GRS codes. Two of them are structural (or key
recovery) attacks, namely the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack and the distinguisher attack based
on the Schur product of the public code. The third one is the best known non-structural attack
called information set decoding (ISD).
4.1. Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack. The first code-based cryptosystem using GRS codes
as secret codes was proposed by Niederreiter in the same article [36] as the famous Niederreiter
cryptosystem. This proposal was then attacked by Sidelnikov and Shestakov in [43], where they
used the fact, that the public matrix is still a generator matrix of a GRS code and they were
able to recover the evaluation points and hence the GRS structure of the public matrix.
In the cryptosystem proposed in Section 3, the secret GRS parity check matrix H over Fqm
is hidden in two ways: first by puncturing its expanded parity check matrix Ĥ over Fq and then
by scrambling the columns of the punctured matrix ĤS . Due to multiplying ĤS with a block
diagonal matrix it is clear that the resulting code is no more equivalent to an evaluation code
(or an expanded evaluation code). Hence evaluations (or expanded evaluation column vectors)
can not be exploited using the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack.
4.2. Distinguisher attack based on the Schur product. For the attack based on the Schur
product we need to introduce some definitions and notations.
Definition 4.1 (Schur product). Let x, y ∈ Fnq . We denote by the Schur product of x and y
their component-wise product
x ⋆ y = (x1y1, . . . , xnyn).
Remark 3. The Schur product is symmetric and bilinear.
Definition 4.2 (Schur product of codes and square code). Let A,B be two codes of length n.
The Schur product of two codes is the vector space spanned by all a ⋆ b with a ∈ A and b ∈ B:
〈A ⋆ B〉 = 〈{a ⋆ b
∣∣ a ∈ A, b ∈ B}〉.
If A = B, then we call 〈A ⋆A〉 the square code of A and denote it by 〈A2〉.
Definition 4.3 (Schur matrix). Let G be a k × n matrix, with rows (gi)1≤i≤k. The Schur
matrix of G, denoted by S(G), consists of the rows gi ⋆ gj for
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k.
We observe by Remark 3, that if G is a generator matrix of a code C then its Schur matrix
S(G) is a generator matrix of the square code of C. Let s be the following map
s : N → N
k 7→
1
2
(
k2 + k
)
.
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For a k × n matrix A, we observe that S(A) has the size s(k)× n.
Various McEliece cryptosystems based on modifications of GRS codes have been proved to
be insecure [15, 18, 20]. This is because the dimension of the square code of GRS codes is
very low compared to a random linear code of the same dimension. Moreover, other families
of codes have also been shown to be vulnerable against the attacks based on Schur products.
In [16], Couvreur et al. presented a general attack against cryptosystems based on algebraic
geometric codes and their subcodes. In [19] Fauge`re et al. showed that high rate binary Goppa
codes can be distinguished from a random code. In [17], Couvreur et al. presented a polynomial
time attack against cryptosystems based on non-binary Goppa codes defined over quadratic
extensions.
The distinguisher attack is based on the low dimensional square code of the public code (or
of the shortened public code). In the following, based on experimental observations, we infer
that the public code of the proposed cryptosystem cannot be distinguished using square code
techniques.
Let ĈS be the public code of the proposed cryptosystem. Note that ĈS is a shortening of an
expanded GRS code Ĉ.
(1) Squares of expanded GRS codes : Like in the case of Reed-Solomon codes and their
subfield subcodes, the expanded GRS codes also have low square code dimension. To
see this, we visualize expanded GRS codes as subfield subcodes of GRS-like codes. Let
C be a GRS code of length n and dimension k over Fqm having the following parity
check matrix
H = Vr(x, y) :=

y1 y2 · · · yn
y1x1 y2x2 · · · ynxn
...
...
. . .
...
y1x
r−1
1 y2x
r−1
2 · · · ynx
r−1
n
 ,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a vector of distinct elements in Fqm , y = (y1, . . . , yn) is a
vector over F∗qm and r := n− k. Let γ be a primitive element in Fqm . We define a new
code B of length mn over Fqm given by the kernel of the following parity check matrix
H ′ =
(
Vr(x, y) | Vr(x, γy) | · · · | Vr(x, γ
m−1y)
)
.
Using Lemma 2.2, it is easy to observe, that the expanded code Ĉ of C with respect to
γ is permutation equivalent to the Fq-kernel of H
′. In other words Ĉ is permutation
equivalent to the subfield subcode of B over Fq. Observe that a generator matrix G
′ of
B is given by
Vk(x, y
′) 0 . . . 0 0
0 Vk(x, γ
−1y′) . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . Vk(x, γ
−(m−2)y′) 0
0 0 . . . 0 Vk(x, γ
−(m−1)y′)
Vr(x, y
′′) 0 . . . 0 −Vr(x, γ
−(m−1)y′′)
0 Vr(x, γ
−1y′′) . . . 0 −Vr(x, γ
1−(m−1)y′′)
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . Vr(x, γ
−(m−2)y′′) −Vr(x, γ
(m−2)−(m−1)y′′)

,
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where y′ is such that Vk(x, y
′)Vr(x, y)
⊺ = 0, and y′′ = (xk1 , x
k
2 , . . . , x
k
n) ⋆ y
′. One can
verify that G′(H ′)⊺ = 0. Observe that a generator matrix of Ĉ is permutation equivalent
to
Ĝ =

G1 0 . . . 0
0 G2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Gm
Ggv
 ,
where Gi is a generator matrix of the subfield subcode of Vk(x, γ
−(i−1)y′) over Fq, and
Ggv is a generator matrix of the Fq-subfield subcode of the bottom (m− 1)r rows of G
′.
The matrix Ggv is also known as the glue-vector generator matrix, as in [45]. Due to
the block structure of Ĝ the Schur matrix of Ĝ will have many zero rows. As a result
the dimension of the square code is not full, given large enough n. This may lead to
vulnerabilities when using expanded GRS codes directly in the cryptosystem.
(2) Effect of Shortening: Consider the parity check matrix Ĥ of an expanded GRS code as
shown in Lemma 2.2. We partition the columns of Ĥ into n blocks, each of size m. By
the definition of Ĥ, each of these blocks corresponds to a unique column vector of the
parity check matrix of the parent GRS code. In order to weaken this correspondence, we
puncture (randomly chosen)m−λ of the columns from each block of Ĥ . As a result the
correspondence of each block to the parent column vector is inconsistent. In addition
we multiply the punctured parity check matrix by an invertible block diagonal matrix
T . This further destroys the algebraic structure inherited from the parent GRS code.
This was evident in our computations of the square code dimension of such shortened
codes. Even in the case of m = 3 we observed that puncturing one column from each
block of Ĥ results in a full square code dimension.
4.3. Information Set Decoding. Information set decoding (ISD) algorithms are the best
known algorithms for decoding a general linear code. ISD algorithms were introduced by Prange
[39] in 1962. Since then several improvements have been proposed for codes over the binary field
by Lee-Brickel [27], Leon [28], Stern [44] and more recently by Bernstein et al. [13], Becker et
al. [9], May-Ozerov [30]. Several of these algorithms have been generalized to the case of codes
over general finite fields, see [21, 22, 23, 35, 38].
An ISD algorithm in its simplest form first chooses an information set I, which is a size
k subset of {1, 2, . . . , n} such that the restriction of the parity check matrix on the columns
indexed by the complement of I is non-singular. Then Gaussian elimination brings the parity
check matrix in a standard form and assuming that the errors are outside of the information
set, these row operations on the syndrome will exploit the error vector, if the weight does not
exceed the given error correction capacity.
ISD for the proposed cryptosystem: In the proposed cryptosystem we introduce a burst pattern
in the error vector, in particular the error vector has support in t sub-vectors each of length λ.
Henceforth, we modify Stern’s ISD algorithm to incorporate such pattern in the error vector.
We first recall the Sterns algorithm. The algorithm partitions the information set I into two
equal-sized subsets X and Y , and chooses uniformly at random a subset Z of size ℓ outside of
I. Then it looks for vectors having exactly weight p among the columns indexed by X , exactly
weight p among the columns indexed by Y , and exactly weight 0 in columns indexed by Z and
the missing weight t− 2p in the remaining indices.
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In the proposed cryptosystem we have been given a public code ĈS of length λn and dimension
k′ := mk− (m−λ)n over Fq. We also know that the error vector has support in t sub-vectors of
length λ. Hence we use Stern’s algorithm on the blocks of size λ. We consider the information
set I to have ⌊k′/λ⌋ blocks. We partition I into two equal-sized subsets X and Y , and choose
uniformly at random a subset Z of ℓ blocks outside of I. Then we look for vectors having
support in exactly p blocks in X , exactly p blocks in Y , and exactly 0 blocks in Z.
In Section 5 we compute the key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem having 256-bit security
against this modified ISD algorithm.
5. Key size
In this section we compute the key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem having 256-bit security
against the ISD algorithm discussed in Section 4.3. Later we compare these key sizes with the key
sizes of the McEliece cryptosystem using binary Goppa codes [11] and some recently proposed
cryptosystems that are using Reed-Solomon codes as secret codes. These are based on the
idea of [5, 6] (BBCRS), where the authors proposed to hide the structure of the code using
as transformation matrix the sum of a rank z matrix and a weight w matrix. The proposed
parameters in [5, 6] with z = 1 and w ≤ 1 +R were broken by the square code attack [15, 18],
where R denotes the rate of the code. Two countermeasures were recently proposed in [8, 25].
In order to hide the structure of the Reed-Solomon code the authors of [8] use w > 1 + R and
z = 1 or w < 1 + R and z > 1. Whereas in [25] the transformation matrix has weight w = 2
and rank z = 0.
In the proposed cryptosystem, the public key is a parity check matrix of a linear code over
Fq having length λn and dimension mk − (m− λ)n. Hence the public key size is (λn−m(n−
k)) ·m(n− k) · log2(q) bits. For a degree of extension m, let Cm be the public code.
In Table 1, we provide the key sizes for different rates of the public code C3 achieving a
256-bit security level against the modified ISD algorithm discussed in Section 4.3. Observe that
the smallest key size is achieved at rate 0.82.
Rate q n k t Key Size (bits)
0.60 13 1382 829 277 6783627
0.65 13 1270 825 223 5952804
0.70 13 1207 844 182 5339456
0.75 13 1192 894 149 4929077
0.80 13 1230 984 123 4702652
0.82 13 1258 1031 114 4624198
0.85 13 1340 1139 101 4634545
0.87 13 1420 1235 93 4692805
0.90 13 1602 1441 81 4863276
Table 1. Comparing key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem with m = 3 and
λ = 2 reaching a 256-bit security level against the modified ISD algorithm.
In Table 2, we provide the key sizes for different rates of the public code C4 achieving a
256-bit security level against the modified ISD algorithm discussed in Section 4.3. In this case
the smallest key size is achieved at rate 0.89.
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Rate q n k t Key Size (bits)
0.65 7 2360 1534 413 13134108
0.70 7 1945 1361 292 10191102
0.75 7 1738 1303 218 8480009
0.80 7 1662 1329 167 7448878
0.85 7 1700 1445 128 6815134
0.87 7 1770 1539 116 6785893
0.89 7 1872 1666 103 6754721
0.91 7 2024 1841 92 6814326
Table 2. Comparing key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem with m = 4 and
λ = 2 reaching a 256-bit security level against the modified ISD algorithm.
In conclusion, for a 256 bit security level we propose to use the cryptosystem with the two
sets of parameters (q = 13,m = 3, λ = 2, n = 1258, k = 1031) and (q = 7,m = 4, λ = 2, n =
1872, k = 1666), see Table 3.
q m n k Key Size (in bits)
Proposed
system
Type I 13 3 1258 1031 4624198
Type II 7 4 1872 1666 6754721
classical McEliece 2 13 6960 5413 8373911
BBCRS
based
schemes
w = 1.708 and z = 1 1423 1 1422 786 5113520
w = 1.2 and z = 10 1163 1 1162 928 2274160
w = 2 and z = 0 1993 1 1992 1593 6966714
Table 3. Comparing the key sizes of the proposed parameters against different cryptosystems.
The proposed parameters for the classic McEliece system using binary Goppa codes by Bern-
stein et al. in [11] are q = 2,m = 13, n = 6960, k = 5413, which gives a key size of 8373911 bits.
It achieves a security level of 260-bits with respect to the ball-collision algorithm [13].
In comparison to the classic McEliece system, the Type I set of parameters reduces the key
size by 44.8% and the Type II set of parameters reduces the key size by 19.3%.
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